

Geographical Voting Bases and the Stability of Candidates' Voter Coalitions(1989~1998)

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Abstract

It is generally assumed that strong grassroots support ensures that Taiwanese legislators get support from the same voters over repeated elections. This paper attempts to test this hypothesis. We look at each candidate's strongest areas in each election. By comparing these areas over several elections, we can search for evidence of instability in his or her vote support.

In general, we find that there is far less stability in support patterns than might be expected. It is rare that all of a candidate's strongest areas in one election are included in his or her strongest areas in subsequent elections. In other words, many legislators have been elected and re-elected with significantly different patterns of support. For the overwhelming majority of candidates, the crucial variable in determining stability is the size of their hometowns. Candidates from large townships generally have more stable support, while those from smaller townships have less stable support.

Key words: campaign strategy, political geography, electoral base, electoral stability

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It is commonly assumed that legislative candidates in Taiwan, especially incumbents, are supported by relatively stable voting coalitions based on voters' party identification, candidates' social networks, issue positions, local identities, ability to deliver pork, etc. This belief is reinforced by a quick look at election results. Incumbents win most of their re-election bids, seemingly with ease and often with a total number of votes very close to that garnered in previous elections. However, these seemingly similar aggregate results can actually be quite disparate when compared at a lower level of analysis. This paper will investigate stability of candidates' support by looking at their strongest areas. Taiwanese candidates rarely get an even percentage of the vote in every precinct. Rather, their votes tend to come disproportionately from a few areas. These areas can be seen as the essence of the candidate's support coalition. For example, it is logical that a candidate whose support comes mostly from fishing interests will get high numbers of votes in areas in which there are many fishermen, candidates appealing to Hakka voters will do best in areas with high percentages of Hakkas, etc. These areas, which collectively form a candidate's base, are extremely important to the candidate's success or failure. As such, it is reasonable to expect that a candidate would try to retain these votes in subsequent elections. If a candidate cannot maintain support in these most critical areas, continuity in other areas less important to his or her political career is even less likely.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the stability of candidates' support coalitions by concentrating on the areas of their greatest electoral strength. I will also seek to identify which types of candidates tend to have more stable support and which tend to be plagued by instability.

Literature Review

Brazilian elections are similar to Taiwanese elections in certain facets. The Brazilian system, featuring open list multi-member legislative districts, creates personalized voting choices not unlike the SNTV system. Electoral districts in Brazil are the states, each of which elects from eight to seventy seats. In such large districts, candidates often find pursuing a more concentrated vote distribution to be a rational strategy. This may be because they are from a local political dynasty, they have made deals with local power brokers, their former jobs led them to cultivate ties in a certain area, or simply because it is cheaper to concentrate limited political resources in a smaller geographical area.

Barry Ames uses two variables to distinguish different types of municipalities. Some candidates get most of their votes in a small number of areas. These areas are considered to be "concentrated." If candidates tend to get votes all over the district, the vote is "scattered." The second axis concerns the degree to which a candidate dominates a particular area. Areas in which candidates garner a high percentage of the vote are "dominant" while others are "shared." Ames then uses this typology to investigate the behavior of congressional deputies. He finds that deputies who dominate their vote bases are more likely to support a strong executive against increased congressional powers. This is because a strong executive is more able to distribute pork, and candidates with well defined vote bases are able to distribute pork more effectively. And indeed, Ames also finds that these dominant candidates are more active in seeking pork (Ames 1994a, 1994b).

Another case that bears some resemblance to present day Taiwan is the old American South, analyzed so incisively by V.O. Key. In that milieu, since all serious politicians were members of the Democratic Party, the Democratic primary was in fact the real election. However, the primary had two parts: the first round and the runoff. If no candidate got a majority in the first round, then the top two candidates entered a runoff for the nomination. Often no candidate could hope to achieve a majority in the first round. In this case, the first round was really the same as the SNTV system with a district magnitude of two.

V.O. Key found numerous examples of concentrated vote distribution all over the south, especially in the party primaries. This usually took the form of localism, with a candidate getting an extremely high number of votes in his home county, a phenomenon Key labeled the "friends and neighbors" effect (Key 1949).

Writing specifically about the Taiwanese case, Liu I-chou and Chen Lu-huei focus on two particular situations in which votes are often highly concentrated. Liu explores the KMT's Responsibility Zone system, in which certain areas are assigned to a candidate. Through control of information to the voters in that area, the KMT assures that the candidate will garner a much higher percentage of the vote than any other candidate. Liu documents the workings of this system in several case studies of elections in Taipei City (1986, 1991, 1992). Chen looks at a more special case: the KMT's Huang Fu-hsing military branch. Huang Fu-hsing candidates are famous for their ability to absolutely dominate the vote in military villages. Chen finds that this is due to a combination of constituency service, organization, and a strong sense of cohesion (1995). Both Liu and Chen emphasize the importance of the KMT party organization in their analyses.

Sheng Shing-yuan looks at the geographic concentration of votes of a much larger

class of candidates: all Legislative Yuan candidates in the five elections from 1983 to 1995. Using the standard deviation of candidates' vote shares from each township as a measure of concentration, Sheng finds several notable trends. First, KMT candidates have much more concentrated support, but this is less dramatic after 1989, by which time the democratization process had matured significantly. In 1989 and subsequent elections, the increased electoral competition meant that KMT candidates could not rely solely on their Responsibility Zones. Instead they were forced to go out into other areas to seek votes. Second, candidates from local factions had more concentrated votes, but, again, this trend was less obvious after 1989. Third, electoral districts with many seats, a small percentage of farmers, and a large percentage of well educated voters all tended to produce candidates with less concentrated vote support (1998).

Finally, in an earlier work, the author has addressed the phenomenon of electoral bases. Male KMT candidates who won their elections were found to have the largest and most concentrated bases. This trend toward strong bases was reinforced if the candidate ran in a district with a large percentage of farmers and fisherman and people with low education levels. Bases tended to be weaker for Legislative Yuan candidates than for candidates for other offices. In assessing the relationship between strong electoral bases and the normal party vote, I found that parties tended to increase their vote inside the bases of their nominees. In other words, candidates did not only absorb party votes inside their bases; they also got some votes which did not normally go to the party. Most significantly for the purposes of this paper, in the course of evaluating whether bases could be transferred from one candidate to another, there was evidence found indicating that bases were not even stable from one election to the next for the same candidate (Batto, 1999).

Definition of an Electoral Base

A candidate's electoral base is comprised of all tsun¹ in which his or her percentage of the total vote exceeds a certain threshold. In other words, the set of all the tsun in an electoral district can be divided into two groups: those which are part of the candidate's base and those which are not.


We wish the base to consist of the candidate's strongest areas, so the threshold must be set high to winnow out the merely average and good areas. One logical threshold is the candidate's overall vote percentage plus the average standard deviation of all candidates. For a candidate with an average distribution of votes, this would result in a base com-

posed of about one sixth of all the tsun in the district. Those candidates whose votes were more concentrated in certain areas would have more tsun above the threshold and bigger bases. On the other hand, if a candidate were to get exactly the same percentage of votes in every tsun, none of them would meet our threshold, and the candidates would not have a base at all.

However, there are two problems with this definition which require its modification. First, district magnitude plays an important role and must not be ignored. Quite simply, the average standard deviation for districts electing two representatives and those electing fifteen varies quite dramatically. For example, if two seats are to be elected, a standard deviation of 10% might be appropriate. Thus, for a candidate whose overall vote share is 25%, the base would consist of all tsun in which that candidate's vote share surpassed 35%. However, in a district with fifteen seats, it is very unlikely that any candidate will garner such a high percentage of votes. In fact, any candidate who can amass a mere 6.25% of the vote is guaranteed to win. With these lower vote percentages, it is no surprise that standard deviations should also be smaller. Instead of adding 10%, it might be appropriate to add only 3% or 4%. In sum, thresholds must take into account the district magnitude.

The second problem is also related to district magnitudes. One would expect that within each particular district magnitude, the extremely concentrated candidates and the extremely scattered candidates would even out, especially with a large enough data sample. Logically we could expect that as district magnitude increases, the average standard deviation of candidates' vote shares would decrease, faster at first and then more slowly as district magnitude becomes larger. In reality, this is not the case. Figure 1 shows average standard deviations for various types of candidates at different district magnitudes. The overall trend is clearly for the average standard deviation to decrease. However, this is not a smooth trend. For example, if we look at the line representing all Legislative Yuan candidates from 1989 to 1998, the average standard deviations for district magnitudes of six, seven, eight, eleven, and twelve descend gradually from about 4.5 to 3.5. However, in the middle of this group, the average plunges to around 2.5 for district magnitudes of nine and ten. Clearly this is not what was expected. Something other than district magnitude is affecting the data.

Figure 1: The B Function and Average Standard Deviations for Various Candidates



The problem is that certain types of districts are disproportionately represented in some district magnitudes. For example, the fact that the average standard deviation for $M = 9$ appears to extremely low is because the large majority of candidates in this category ran in Taipei City. Taipei City is the most urbanized area in Taiwan. Voters in Taipei City are the most highly educated and are among the most mobile in Taiwan. Moreover, there were also a relatively high number of New Party nominees among these candidates. All of these factors are associated strongly with less concentrated vote distributions. (Batto, 1999) The end result is that the average standard deviation is pulled much lower than it would otherwise be.

What is needed is variable which is similar to the average standard deviation but is dependent only on district magnitude. To meet this need, we construct a function B defined as:

$$B = 20 - 18 \left(\frac{M+1}{M+3} \right)$$

where $2 < B \leq 11$ for $1 \leq M < \infty$.

This rather unwieldy function is completely subjective in nature. There is no theoret-

ical basis for each individual component; rather the height and slope are meant to mimic the actual data without being subject to sudden dips and peaks. Figure 1 plots function B against average standard deviations for various types of candidates.

Given the B function, the threshold for inclusion into the base of candidate i is rather simple: the overall vote percentage of candidate i plus the value of B at the given district magnitude ($\mu_i + B_M$). This threshold is completely independent of outside influences such as the level of urbanization in the district or the candidate's party affiliation. In addition, while B mimics the average standard deviation for one set of candidates, those who competed in elections from 1989 to 1998, it is not dependent on that data. The addition of future data will not affect B in any way. This makes it possible to compare candidates from different elections or even different countries.

To give a simple example, suppose candidate A is running for one of four seats in the legislature from a district with only 14 tsun and her vote totals are as listed in Table 1. Candidate A received 22.92% of the total vote. B_4 equals 7.14, so the threshold for inclusion is $22.92 + 7.14 = 30.06$. Of the 14 tsun, only Tsun H, Tsun I, and Tsun J meet this threshold, so Candidate A's base consists of these three tsun.

Table 1: The Calculation of Candidate A's Electoral Base

Tsun	Total Valid Votes	Candidate A Votes	Candidate A Share	Inclusion in Base
Tsun A	1025	251	24.49	
Tsun B	927	105	11.33	
Tsun C	1306	98	7.50	
Tsun D	1284	117	9.11	
Tsun E	1176	84	7.14	
Tsun F	832	103	12.38	
Tsun G	1094	139	12.71	
Tsun H	1145	678	59.21	*
Tsun I	1125	903	80.27	*
Tsun J	1150	607	52.78	*
Tsun K	965	105	10.88	
Tsun L	1457	187	12.83	
Tsun M	988	94	9.51	
Tsun N	1275	138	10.82	
Total	15749	3609	22.92	

There are two features of this definition that merit particular emphasis. First, there is nothing in this definition that requires the tsun included in a base be geographically contiguous. In fact, while most bases do include an element of geographical contiguity, other bases are built on quite different foundations. For example, the bases of candidates representing the KMT military wing usually include many military villages. These villages are often not concentrated in any one area, but rather are scattered throughout the entire district.

The second feature is that the base is defined as the candidate's strongest areas at one certain point in time. There is no element of continuity implied in this definition. A candidate running in one election will build one base. In the next election, he or she will build a different base. The tsun included in the two bases may overlap to a very high degree, or they may not overlap at all. In fact, the main thrust of this paper is to precisely determine whether or not there is continuity in candidates' bases from one election to the next.

Every base has two dimensions, magnitude and intensity. The magnitude of a base reflects the extent to which the candidate can rely on votes from the base to win election. The theoretical threshold for election is the total number of valid votes divided by the number of seats plus one ($V/(M+1)$). The magnitude of a base is defined as the fraction of the theoretical threshold provided by the base.

$$\text{Magnitude} = 100 * \left(\frac{\text{number of votes gained inside base}}{\text{total number of valid votes}/M+1} \right)$$

$$0 \leq \text{magnitude} < \infty.$$

To illustrate this variable, we continue with the example of Candidate A from above. Candidate A's base consisted of three tsun, from which she gained a total of 2188 votes. There were 15749 valid votes cast for candidates for the four seats available in the district. Thus the magnitude of her base is $(100 * 2188/(15749/5))$ or 69.5. That is to say, Candidate A got 69.5% of the votes she needed for election inside her base. Keep in mind that this assumes the threshold of election is the theoretical maximum. In practice it is almost always considerably lower. In some districts, 69% of the theoretical threshold might even be enough to win election. Thus, we can see that Candidate A has a very substantial base.

The second dimension, intensity, reflects the difference in vote share inside and outside the candidate's base. However, just as average standard deviations are different for

candidates running in districts with different district magnitudes, the difference in vote share inside and outside a base is also affected by district magnitude. In order to allow comparison between candidates, we normalize this difference by the function B . Thus intensity is defined as follows:

$$\text{Intensity} = \frac{\text{percentage of the inside base} - \text{percentage of the vote outside base}}{B_M}$$

$$1 < \text{intensity} < 100/B_M.$$

By definition, the percentage a candidate receives inside his or her base will always be higher than the percentage received outside it. More specifically, a candidate's vote share inside his or her base must be at least B_M higher than his or her overall vote share. Conversely, the candidate's vote share outside the base will always be lower than his or her overall vote share because the strongest areas are inside the base. Thus, the intensity index will always be greater than one. Theoretically, the upper limit for the intensity index would be $100/B_M$. However, one should recall that the function B mimics the average standard deviation. Thus, it is not surprising that very few bases have an intensity index as high as four or five.

As above, we offer the example of Candidate A. Inside her base, Candidate A received 2188 of 3420 votes, or 63.98%. Outside her base, she garnered only 1421 of 12329 votes, or 11.53%. Her intensity index is $((63.98 - 11.53)/7.14)$ or 7.35. This extremely high number reflects the intense concentration of her votes inside her base.

The Data

The basic unit of analysis is the candidate. The candidates used in this paper include all the candidates in geographical constituencies in the four Legislative Yuan general elections from 1989 to 1998. Candidates running in uncontested elections, in functional constituencies, on party lists, in aboriginal constituencies, or in either of the two districts in Fujian Province are all excluded from this data set. This leaves us with a total of 1228 candidates.

Pervasiveness of Bases

The first question we must ask concerns the extent to which bases characterize elec-

tions in Taiwan. Simply, do all candidates have a base or do only a small percentage have one? Table 2 reveals that of the 1228 total candidates, 360 had no base at all. In other words, the vote distribution of roughly 30% of all candidates was so even that their vote share didn't exceed the base threshold in any tsun. However, taking this result at face value is a bit misleading. Most of the 360 candidates were not serious contenders for office. Rather, they tended to be the type of candidate who gets only a few hundred votes. Only 44 of the 360 got more than 5,000 votes, and only 16 exceeded 10,000. What this means is that almost every serious candidate had a base. In fact, of the 481 candidates elected to the Legislative Yuan, only four did not have a base.

The fact that candidates without a base are almost exclusively minor candidates means that we can ignore them without seriously affecting our understanding of elections in Taiwan. Thus the following analysis will exclude candidates with no base from consideration.

Among the 868 candidates who had a base, the average base magnitude was 18.8. In other words, the average candidate received slightly under 20% of the theoretical election threshold from his or her base. Since the actual threshold of election is usually significantly lower than the theoretical threshold, it is obvious that bases contributed significantly to a candidate's chances of election.

The average intensity of the 868 bases was 2.36. This means that the average candidate received a vote share 2.36 B units higher inside his or her base than outside. Recall that the B function is a surrogate for average standard deviation. So, roughly speaking, vote percentages inside bases were somewhat more than two standard deviations higher than vote percentages in other areas. It is worth noting that our definition only required an intensity of greater than one. The actual average is much higher than one, reflecting the fact that vote share in most tsun in a base is far above the threshold.

Table 2: Base Magnitude and Intensity by District Magnitude

District Magnitude	Total Number of Candidates	Candidates with No Base	Candidates With a Base				
			Number of Candidates	Base Magnitude		Base Intensity	
				Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.
1	56	13	43	12.5	10.2	1.87	0.49
2	104	21	83	14.1	14.0	1.97	0.60
3	88	21	67	20.2	16.7	2.37	0.94
4	166	47	119	20.1	15.6	2.51	1.01
5	52	9	43	23.7	19.7	2.52	0.95
6	171	54	117	20.4	14.7	2.47	0.92
7	107	25	82	22.1	16.6	2.43	1.01
8	39	10	29	19.2	17.4	2.34	1.14
9	177	75	102	16.4	13.9	2.21	1.08
10	93	36	57	17.3	17.6	2.02	0.80
11	51	14	37	24.2	17.7	2.95	1.67
12	26	5	21	21.8	17.2	2.43	1.15
16	48	16	32	18.7	19.3	2.74	1.45
17	50	14	36	13.3	12.7	2.49	1.86
Total	1228	360	868	18.8	15.9	2.36	1.07

Components of a Base

Most bases can be divided into three distinct parts. The tsun included in the candidate's hometown are the heart of the base. We refer to them as "central tsun." Quite often, the great majority or even all of the tsun in the township² are included in the base. Usually the candidate gets a higher percentage of the vote in the central tsun than in the rest of the base. In addition, as we will see below, the central tsun are generally the most stable parts of the base over time. If localism is a strong element helping the candidate to accumulate high vote totals on his or her home turf, it also works to a lesser extent in neighboring townships. We refer to tsun in the candidate's base located in these neighboring townships as "adjacent tsun." Usually, a large percentage of the tsun of the neighboring townships are included in the base, though the percentage is almost always lower than in the central areas. The percentage of the vote the candidate receives in adjacent tsun is usually fairly high; but, again, it is lower usually lower than that for the central areas. While the central tsun are usually fairly stable over time, the adjacent tsun are more vul-

nerable to fluctuation. The candidate benefits from localism; however, he or she is not really a hometown candidate. If another candidate with a stronger claim to the local votes runs in a subsequent election, votes from the adjacent tsun can disappear almost completely. The remaining tsun in the base comprise the third part of the base. We refer to these as “scattered tsun.” As the name implies, they tend to be scattered rather randomly over the remaining parts of the electoral district. Scattered tsun tend to contribute a lower percentage of votes and are less stable than central or adjacent tsun.

Liao Ta-lin’s 1992 base provides a good illustration of these three parts of the base. Liao, a DPP member, won election to the Legislative Yuan from Yunlin County with the most votes in that district. One of the most critical factors in his victory was his strong base (magnitude of 37.6; intensity index of 3.22). As Figure 2 shows, the tsun in Liao’s base were concentrated along the northern border of Yunlin County in three townships: Erlun, Hsilo, and Tsutung. Not surprisingly, Liao is a native of Hsilo. However, further away from Hsilo, Liao’s support tends to be rather scattered. We can see the effect of localism even more clearly when we look at the share of the vote Liao received in each of the three parts. In the central tsun, Liao got 48.9% of the votes. In adjacent tsun, the percentage declined to 36.0%. And in the scattered tsun, it was only 30.3%. Liao Ta-lin’s experience also illustrates the ephemeral nature of adjacent tsun. Liao ran in the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections. Each time, Hsilo and Erlun gave strong support to him. However, if we look at Tsutung, the story is different. In 1992, 13 of Tsutung’s 14 tsun were in Liao’s base. In 1995, 8 tsun passed the threshold of inclusion. While not as good as 1992, this performance still made Tsutung a strong area for Liao. However, in 1998, Tsutung had its own hometown candidate. Liao’s advantage was erased completely. None of Tsutung’s tsun gave him enough support to be included in his base. In fact, Liao’s vote share in Tsutung was only 0.3% above his overall vote share, a far cry from the 1992 result.

Figure 2: Base of Liao Ta-lin, 1992 Yunlin County Legislative Yuan Election




Table 3: Vote Shares in Parts of Liao Ta-lin's 1992 Yunlin County Base

Area	Votes Received	Valid Votes	Vote Share	N
Central Tsun (Hsilo)	10046	20530	48.9	22
Adjacent Tsun (Tsutung, Erlun)	7470	20774	36.0	21
Scattered Tsun	8381	27641	30.3	30
All Tsun in Base	25897	68945	37.6	73
All Tsun not in Base	40120	275100	14.6	311
District Total	66017	344045	19.2	384

Stability of Support over Time

“Common knowledge” tells us that most established legislative candidates do indeed have stable support. In fact, it is when the established pattern of voting is upset that candidates are supposed to be in trouble. So when we hear of the candidate whose vote brokers have defected or the candidate who faces a strong challenger on his or her home turf, we do not hold out much hope for his or her prospects. It seems that they will fail to retain their previous supporters. Therefore, they will almost certainly lose. We do not generally consider the possibility that this might be a normal occurrence, that there might actually be a large number of candidates who win repeatedly, but with a different support coalition every time. It seems extremely farfetched that instability could be compatible with success. This common knowledge probably remains unchallenged for the simple reason that it makes so much sense that no one has considered a challenge to be worthwhile.

In this section we will use the concept of the base to investigate how stable coalitions of vote support are. The base is the strongest part of the candidate's vote coalition. It includes only the areas which give him or her above average vote support. Indeed, we can interpret the base as the essence of the candidate's support. As such, if the coalition remains stable over time, we should expect the same areas to repeatedly give strong support to the candidate. Most of the tsun inside the base in one election should also be inside the base in the next election.

It is important to realize what this does not imply. It does not imply that the candidate will get the same number or percentage of votes. If the candidate gets 30% of the vote in one election and 25% of the vote in the next election, the threshold for inclusion into the second base will be lower. The vote share from a given tsun might decline from 45% to 35% and still be inside both bases. It does not imply that the same voters will vote for the candidate. This is, of course, what we would ultimately like to prove when considering stability. However, in the absence of individual level survey data, this type of inference is impossible. It is possible, though very unlikely, that a candidate could get 30% of the vote in a certain tsun in two elections without any single voter having voted for him or her twice. We must rephrase the problem from the negative standpoint. If a candidate gets a high percentage of the vote at time one and a very low percentage of the vote at time two, there must be some instability. In sum, if a candidate has exactly the same bases in two elections, it means only that the strongest areas at time one are also the strongest areas at time two. No new areas have supplanted the old ones, and none of the formerly above average areas have fallen to a lower standard, relative to all other areas in the electoral district. Stability of voter support is not proved, but it is a very possible explanation. In reading the following analysis, it is important to keep in mind what a low standard we are setting. What looks like stability may actually be very unstable. Stability will almost certainly be overestimated.

The Core

We start by searching for the "core" of the candidate's support. While a base is defined as including the strongest areas at a certain point in time, the core adds an element of continuity. A core is defined as including the tsun which are in a majority of the candidate's bases. That is, if a candidate has run in three elections, any tsun in any two or all three of the bases is part of the core. If the candidate has run in four elections, the tsun must be in at least three of the bases. We do not require a perfect record; every once in a while special circumstances may prevent the candidate from getting a large vote share in a certain area. However, if this happens too often, the circumstances may not be so special after all.

After the core is defined, we can compare each of the bases with the core. There are

two kinds of instability which must be considered. The first is failure to maintain a high standard in the core. This refers to a tsun in the core not being included in a base. The degree to which this occurs is quantified by dividing the valid votes of tsun in both the base and in the core by the valid votes of all the tsun in the core. That is

$$\text{Defend} = 100 * \left(\frac{\text{total valid votes of tsun inside core and base}}{\text{total valid votes of tsun inside core}} \right)$$
$$0 \leq \text{defend} < 100.$$

This index ranges from 0 to 100. A value of zero means that none of the tsun in the core were inside the candidate's base in that particular election, a very unlikely result. A value of 100 indicates that the base included all of the tsun in the core. In practice, we have defined the core as including tsun which appear in the candidate's base at least 67% or 75% of the time, depending on whether the candidate ran three or four times. Because of this, the value of the defense index is rarely below either 67 or 75. If it does fall below this level for one election, it is almost sure to be above it for the other elections.

To illustrate this index, we look at Wang Chin-ping, the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan. Wang has won eight consecutive terms to the legislature from Kaohsiung County. During the time period under consideration, he has run in all four races. In the four races, his bases have included 95, 96, 111, and 101 tsun. A total of 177 tsun have appeared in his bases at least one time. Of these, 69 have been in at least three bases. These 69 tsun make up Wang's core. In 1998, these 69 tsun produced 80605 total valid votes. 63 of the 69 tsun were inside Wang's base that year. These 63 tsun produced 74774 valid votes. Thus, Wang's defense index for 1998 was $100 * 74774/80605 = 93.8$. This means that Wang successfully included nearly 95% of his core in his 1998 base.

If failure to defend one's core could be considered "bad" instability, most candidates would consider the second type of instability, growth, to be "good." While expansion of a base may improve a candidate's chances of election, it also implies a change in the coalition of voters supporting him or her.

Growth is quantified in a manner very similar to defense. The growth index is defined as the number of votes in tsun inside the base but outside the core divided by the number of votes in tsun in the core.

$$\text{Grow} = 100 * \left(\frac{\text{total valid votes of tsun inside the base but not inside the core}}{\text{total valid votes of tsun inside the core}} \right)$$
$$0 \leq \text{grow} \leq \infty .$$

This expresses growth as a percentage of the core. Thus a growth index of 100 implies that the parts of candidate's base outside the core were equal in size to the core itself. The lower limit of this index is zero, which would mean that there was no growth of the base outside the core. There is no theoretical upper limit to this index. Indeed, if the core is very small, the growth index could be very large. However, for candidates with a substantial core, this index is usually under 100. Continuing the example of Wang Chin-ping, in 1998 Wang's base included 101 tsun. Of these, 38 were not part of his core. These 38 tsun produced a total of 36018 valid votes. Wang's growth index for 1998 is $100 * 36018 / 80605 = 44.7$. In other words, Wang expanded his base outside his core by about 45% the size of the core.

There are a few limitations to this method of quantification. The first is that it is only useful for candidates who have run several times. Obviously, it is impossible to talk about stability for candidates who have only run once. With two campaigns, we can begin to analyze continuity, but it is probably premature. Due to this, we will only consider candidates who have run either three or four times during the ten year period under consideration.

The second drawback is that it only works for candidates who have substantial bases. It is only reasonable to use bases to estimate stability if bases constitute a significant portion of the candidate's support coalition. As noted above, almost all successful candidates have a nonzero base. However, some of these bases are very small, including less than five tsun. To make a judgement based on such a small fraction of the entire electoral district is probably a bit rash. Moreover, as noted above, if the core is small, the value of the growth index is prone to be very unstable. To avoid these problems, it is necessary to further limit the candidates under consideration. Only candidates with a core of at least 20 tsun are considered.

Third, because the core is defined differently for candidates running in either three or four elections, it is inappropriate to analyze them jointly. The threshold for inclusion in the core of candidates in three races is to be in 67% of the bases, while 75% is required for candidates who ran four times. The defense and growth indices will almost certainly

be lower for the former group than for the latter. This does not mean that candidates running four times showed less stability; it means only that the definition of stability is stricter for them. Instead of lumping all candidates together, they must be considered separately according to the number of times they ran.

We are left with 53 candidates, 40 of whom ran three times and 13 of whom ran in all four of the elections.³ These 53 candidates are not a representative group. Candidates from urban areas are underrepresented, for example, as are opposition party candidates. In fact, there are no New Party members among the 53 candidates. The candidates in our sample are also much more successful than average. Of their 171 campaigns, 147 (86.0%) were successful while only 24 were losing efforts. Bases were a major element in their success. While the average base magnitude and intensity for all candidates were 18.8 and 2.36, the candidates who ran in three elections averaged 30.1 and 2.88, and candidates in all four elections averaged 35.7 and 3.71. In short, this group can be loosely described as longtime KMT legislators from rural districts who have sharply defined geographical constituencies. There are some candidates who don't fit this description, but they are the minority.

A final point to consider before we begin analyzing the data is that these candidates should have more stable vote coalitions than the average candidate. They are winners with deep local roots. Voters are familiar with them and have probably formed stable opinions of what these candidates stand for. These candidates have served their communities for years or even decades, amassing enormous amounts of political capital. If stability is to be found, it should be evident in the coalitions supporting these candidates.

The Stability of Partisan, Faction, and Military Candidates

The obvious place to begin looking for differences in stability of bases is with political parties. KMT candidates tend to have more geographically concentrated votes than DPP candidates (Batto 1999; Sheng 1998). It might be expected that they also have more stable cores. However, the data do not give strong support to this hypothesis. DPP candidates in three elections have slightly less stable support than KMT candidates. Their defense index is marginally lower (83.8 to 85.1) and their growth index is higher (35.3 to 28.9, see Table 4). However, these trends do not hold for candidates in all four

elections. For these candidates, the defense index of KMT candidates is noticeably lower than for DPP candidates (89.6 to 95.8) and the growth index is much higher (79.5 to 49.6). Thus we find mixed signals. Certainly there is not enough evidence to conclude that either DPP candidates or KMT candidates have more stable support.

Table 4: Stability of Bases of Candidates Who Have Run Three or Four Times

	Candidates in Three Elections							Candidates in Four Elections						
	Defend	Grow	Mag. Core	Int. Core	Mag. Base	Int. Base	N	Defend	Grow	Mag. Core	Int. Core	Mag. Base	Int. Base	N
KMT	85.1	28.9	26.8	2.74	30.7	2.93	80	89.6	79.5	26.2	3.41	36.5	3.33	38
DPP	83.8	35.3	24.7	2.59	28.9	2.68	38	95.8	49.6	30.9	4.44	38.1	4.08	5
Other	96.0	32.0	16.1	6.11	21.6	6.54	1	87.3	20.2	26.7	4.96	30.9	5.10	9
Faction	83.1	29.8	29.9	2.76	34.8	3.05	37	87.7	87.8	19.7	2.66	32.2	2.73	24
Other	85.5	30.5	24.3	2.70	27.9	2.80	82	91.6	47.9	32.8	4.73	38.7	4.55	28
Military	91.3	26.1	20.4	3.17	23.3	3.07	7	91.0	17.1	48.0	4.91	52.2	4.92	8
Other	84.4	30.5	26.4	2.69	30.5	2.86	112	89.6	75.3	22.9	3.57	32.7	3.49	44
Large town	90.4	18.2	30.0	3.33	32.1	3.37	21	94.9	24.5	29.5	7.00	33.9	6.54	8
Major city	82.7	37.8	20.3	1.93	25.1	2.16	18	86.8	133.0	11.6	2.22	25.0	2.39	4
Other	83.8	31.7	26.3	2.74	30.6	2.91	80	89.1	68.0	27.8	3.29	37.1	3.27	40
Total	84.8	30.3	26.0	2.72	30.1	2.88	119	89.8	66.3	26.8	3.78	35.7	3.71	52

A second possibility to consider is whether candidates representing local factions have more stable support. These candidates tend to have very strong grass roots connections. They also tend to have well developed organizations canvassing votes for them. If a candidate is supported by a vote broker associated with the faction in one election, the chances that he or she will be supported by that vote broker in subsequent elections should be fairly high. However, the data do not support this hypothesis. The defense and growth indices for candidates running in three elections are virtually identical. If anything, non-faction candidates appear to be marginally more stable. Faction candidates who have run in four elections are significantly less stable than non-faction candidates. Their defense index is a bit lower (87.7 to 91.6) and their average growth is a whopping 40 points higher. We can find further evidence of the instability of faction candidates by comparing bases and cores. Using the same definitions given above for base magnitude and intensity,

we can also compute core magnitude and intensity. Of course, if a candidate's support is extremely stable, the base and core will be the same. Otherwise, the difference in the two reflects instability. If we look at candidates who have run three times, base magnitudes are higher than core magnitudes for both faction and non-faction candidates. The difference is marginally larger for faction candidates, whose base magnitudes are 4.9% higher than core magnitudes, than for non-faction candidates, who have a difference of 3.6%. The difference between base intensity and core intensity is larger. Non-faction base intensities are an average of 0.10 higher; while for faction candidates, the difference is 0.29. This trend is much more pronounced for candidates in four elections. Faction candidates' base magnitudes and intensities are 12.5% and 0.10 higher than core magnitudes. For non-faction candidates, the respective figures are 5.9% and -0.18. What this means is that if we take the core as a foundation of the base, faction candidates add more areas to this foundation, and they get significantly higher vote percentages from these "extra" areas. Or to put it another way, faction candidates are more likely to have tsun which yield extremely high vote shares in one election and are not even part of the base in other elections. A likely explanation of this instability has to do with vote brokers. If a local vote broker supports the candidate in one election but not in another, it is very possible that the voters in that area will also switch their allegiance.

While differences in stability are barely evident for candidates of different parties and are not overly dramatic for faction candidates, this is not the case with a third group of candidates, those representing the KMT Huang Fu-hsing party branch. The Huang Fu-hsing branch represents military interests, and its candidates are very strong in the various military villages. Especially outside of the Taipei area, the Huang Fu-hsing candidates appeal to a completely different constituency than other candidates. Before the establishment of the New Party, this constituency basically had nowhere else to turn. This made the voter coalitions supporting Huang Fu-hsing candidates extremely stable.

Table 4 provides evidence of the stability of military candidates' support. The trend is obvious but not glaring for candidates who have run three times. Military candidates' defense index is higher than non-military candidates' (91.3 to 84.4), and their growth index is lower (26.1 to 30.5). The difference is not so great because this group of three Huang Fu-hsing candidates, two ran in Taipei City and Taipei County where other candidates also appeal to the same constituency. The third was from Tainan City, where the

military does not have enough votes to elect a candidate by itself. This candidate had to rely on other constituencies to fill out his vote coalition. All of these conditions served to reduce the stability of the support coalitions. The stability of military candidates is much more dramatic for two candidates who ran in all four elections. These two candidates ran in districts with enough military voters to elect a candidate by themselves. However, neither district had so many military voters that other candidates sought to steal the "extra" military votes. In essence, these two candidates had a monopoly on their voters, especially before the emergence of the New Party. Their bases were extremely stable. They defended an average of 91.7%⁴ of their core, slightly above the overall average. But they seldom ventured outside their cores to appeal for votes. Their average growth index was only 17.1, far below the average of 75.3 for non-military candidates. The reason these candidates did not need to search for new voters is that their cores were extremely large, with an average core magnitude of 48.0. That is, military candidates got half the votes they needed to be absolutely certain of election inside their cores. Other candidates' cores provided less than half that amount. We illustrate the stability of military candidates' bases with the example of Hsiao Chin-lan. Hsiao has represented Kaohsiung County in the legislature for four terms, starting in 1989. Figure 3 reveals that her core is concentrated in two main areas, along the border between Fengshan and Taliao townships and in Kangshan township.⁵ The most striking feature of Hsiao's case is the dearth of tsun appearing in her bases only once or twice. Only 33 tsun were in one of her bases but not in her core compared with 49 tsun in her core. Hsiao's core was large, providing between 27% and 43% of the votes she needed for election (Table 5). Further, the importance of these areas can be seen by the glaring discrepancy in the percentage of votes she got inside and outside her core. Hsiao's core intensity index for the four elections ranged from 3.81 to 6.13. The overall picture is one of a candidate with a well defined constituency. Over repeated elections, the same areas turned out in force to support Hsiao. Moreover, outside these areas of strength, Hsiao's support was consistently weak. In other words, the coalition of voters supporting Hsiao over the four elections from 1989 to 1998 was extremely stable.

Figure 3: Core of Hsiao Chin-lan, Huang Fu-hsing, Kaohsiung County




Table 5: Stability of Hsiao Chin-lan, Huang Fu-hsing, Kaohsiung County

Year	Defense	Growth	Total Votes Won	Votes Won in Core	Core Magnitude	Core Intensity
1989	99.0	15.5	81673	35222	39.5	5.74
1992	100.0	16.8	65685	32913	43.1	6.13
1995	86.5	11.3	51404	21624	27.8	3.81
1998	95.9	12.3	50945	20708	35.4	4.64

Hometowns and Stability

While Huang Fu-hsing candidates have more stable support coalitions than other candidates, their numbers are extremely limited. For the vast majority of candidates who do not draw on a pool of voters highly conscious of their differences with the rest of society there must be a different source of stability or instability. It turns out that the most important variable deals with the candidate's hometown. In a preceding section we found that the candidate's hometown is usually well represented in his or her base. Not only do candidates enjoy a higher degree of support in their home areas, these areas are also more loyal over time. Tsun in the candidate's hometown almost always comprise an essential part of the candidate's core. If the candidate is lucky enough to come from a township with a substantial population, he or she is more likely to have a large core and, therefore, a more stable support coalition. On the other hand, if the candidate has the misfortune of being a native of a very small township, he or she will tend to have a much smaller core. Most of the large town candidates are from northern Taiwan. Taipei County provides the ideal setting for this type of candidate. Taipei County now has ten townships with population of at least 150,000. Candidates hailing from any one of these townships can focus entirely on the population in their hometown, counting any outside votes as unexpected bonuses. In addition, because each party has numerous nominees, voters can usually vote for a local candidate of the party of their choice. Indeed, the high number of candidates may encourage localism. Since there are too many candidates for the average voter to consider each individually, one easy way to decide who to vote for is simply to vote for the local candidate. Outside of Taipei County, conditions are less favorable for this type of can-

didate. Put simply, most of the townships in the rest of Taiwan are just not large enough for a candidate to focus solely on his or her hometown. As a rule of thumb, a township must have at least 60% of the population needed for one legislative seat to support this type of candidate. Outside of Taipei County not many such townships exist. Moreover, of those townships with the requisite population, not all are hospitable to hometown candidates for reasons that will be explained below.

Table 4 demonstrates the stability of large town candidates. For candidates running in three elections, candidates from large townships defended 90.4% of their cores as opposed to the overall average of 84.8%. Their growth rates were also far lower. Large town candidates averaged growth of only 18.2%, while the overall average was above 30%.

Lu Hsin-min is a good example of the large town candidate. Lu, a KMT member, ran for the legislature in 1992, 1995, and 1998, losing in 1995 and winning the other two times. Lu hails from Pateh Township in Taoyuan County. This township is not the largest in the county, but it has a substantial population. In 1992, Pateh's population of 137953 represented 9.7% of the total county population. In that election Taoyuan County was allotted seven seats in the legislature, so Pateh represented about 68% of one seat, making it just large enough for a local candidate to concentrate entirely on winning the local vote. By 1998, Pateh's fast population growth combined with the increase of total seats in the legislature to make Pateh worth 1.15 seats. Figure 4 shows Lu's dominance in Pateh. All the tsun were in his core. However, outside of Pateh, Lu had very few strong areas. Only a few tsun in neighboring Tahsi and sparsely populated Fuhsing gave him consistent support. We can see the degree of concentration of Lu's support from his high core intensity (5.54, 3.76, and 4.48 in the three elections respectively, Table 6). For Lu, it was either feast inside Pateh or famine elsewhere. However, Pateh was enough. Lu's core gave him nearly 40% of the votes he needed in his two winning campaigns. In addition to being critically important, Lu's core was also extremely stable. His defense index was at least 90 in every election, and his growth index never got as high as 20.⁶

Table 6: Stability of Lu Hsin-min, Large Town, Taoyuan County

Year	Defense	Growth	Total Votes Won	Votes Won in Core	Core Magnitude	Core Intensity
1992	92.7	3.3	57142	30351	38.7	5.54
1995	100.0	17.3	40539	19715	27.8	3.76
1998	89.6	13.1	42277	19059	36.9	4.48

Figure 4: Core of Lu Hsin-min, Large Town, Taoyuan County



Most candidates are not as fortunate as Lu. They do not come from townships with large populations, and so they have to look elsewhere for votes. This is not to say that voters in small towns do not support their hometown candidates fervently. They do. In fact, many small towns give their local standard bearers much higher vote percentages than large towns do. The cores of small town candidates usually contain all or almost all of that town's tsun. However, there are just not enough voters in small towns for candidates to depend solely on the local vote. In terms of base structure, the central tsun account for a much smaller percentage of the base. Instead, the scattered tsun take on much more weight. However, scattered tsun have no reinforcing ties of localism and are less stable than central tsun. They are far less likely to be included in the candidate's core.

Liao Fu-pen is our example of the small town candidate. Liao has represented the KMT and Yunlin County in the legislature since 1983. Liao's hometown of Kukeng is not among the smallest of Yunlin's townships, but neither does it have an abundance of voters. In 1989, Kukeng's population was worth 15% of one seat; in 1998 it represented 29% of a seat. No matter how wholeheartedly Kukeng's voters supported Liao, it is clear that he needed other votes to win elections. In fact, Kukeng did give Liao strong support. Figure 5 reveals that Liao's strongest support came from Kukeng and adjacent Touliu and Linnei. Unlike the case in either Figure 3 or Figure 4, there are many tsun from outside the core which at one time or another appeared in one of Liao's bases. These tsun gave strong support one or two times, but they were not consistent supporters of Liao. Liao's only source of consistent support was Kukeng. 18 of Kukeng's 20 tsun were in Liao's core. Outside of Kukeng, 102 of 364 tsun appeared in one or two bases, but only 14 gave him support consistent enough to be inside his core. The resulting core was fairly small. Liao's core magnitude in the four elections was about 15, meaning he got only a very small number of the votes he needed from his core areas. As a result, Liao had to look outside his core for support. In one election, his growth index was above 100, meaning he added areas outside his core to his base that were collectively larger than the core itself. Thus, while core magnitudes were small, base magnitudes were much larger, around 25 to 30. In sum, Liao needed votes outside of his hometown to win. He got these "outside" votes in every election. However, he did not get the same "outside" votes. In each election, he got strong support from different areas.

Figure 5: Core of Liao Fu-pen, Small Town, Yunlin County




Table 7: Stability of Liao Fu-pen, Small Town, Yunlin County

Year	Defense	Growth	Total Votes Won	Votes Won in Core	Core Magnitude	Core Intensity
1989	96.3	80.2	42273	10104	15.0	2.76
1992	92.2	60.6	49147	11901	17.3	3.07
1995	93.4	100.5	65261	12093	17.6	2.23
1998	81.8	82.3	36395	8925	17.5	2.68

From the above two types of candidates, it is obvious that the size of the candidate's hometown is crucial to the stability of that candidate's support coalition. However, a large hometown is not a guarantee of stability. Indeed, it is not even always conducive to stability. Some large towns are prone to producing local candidates with very unstable support. Hsinchuang Township in Taipei County (representing 1.59 seats in 1992) is a very good hometown. Fengshan Township in Kaohsiung County (1.54 seats in 1992) is terrible. The crucial difference is that Hsinchuang is of several large townships in Taipei County while Fengshan is the only large township in Kaohsiung County. In Kao-hsiung County, Fengshan is a crucial market for all candidates. Typically, a Kaohsiung candidate will build a strong base in his or her hometown and then try to fill out his or her vote totals with Fengshan votes, which account for roughly a quarter of the total votes in Kaohsiung County. He or she can write off any small township with a strong local candidate, but no one can write off Fengshan. A candidate from a small town probably will not face too much competition at home, but a candidate from Fengshan will be under intense pressure in his or her home market. As a result, candidates from townships which are the major population center in their election district tend not to benefit from a strong hometown effect. The difference in stability between candidates from the major city in the district and candidates from one of many large towns is striking. For candidates in three campaigns, major city candidates have much smaller and less intense cores. Table 4 reveals that large town candidates' core magnitudes are about 50% larger than major city candidates' (30.0 to 20.3). Major city candidates are also far less adept at defending these small cores, their average defense index is 82.7, much lower than the 90.4 for large town candidates. And while the large town candidates' bases include areas outside the core equal to a bit less than 20% of the core, for major city candidates, this figure is


doubled.

As an example of this major city phenomenon, we look at Lin Hsi-shan, the only major city candidate to have run four times. Lin, a KMT member, was successful in his first three campaigns but lost in 1998. From simply looking at the map of Lin's support (Figure 6), one would be hard pressed to say which township he comes from. In fact, he is from Changhua Township. Changhua Township has about 17% of the total population of Changhua County and should be easily large enough to support a hometown candidate. In 1989, its population was large enough to elect 0.69 legislators. By 1998, Changhua Township's weight had increased to 1.73 seats. However, Changhua Township is without question the major city in Changhua County. The only other large township, Yuanlin, is only about half the size of Changhua Township. Because of this, almost all candidates campaign heavily in Changhua Township. For Lin Hsi-shan, the result is a very weak core providing only about 10% of the total votes needed for election. Only 33 of Changhua Township's 73 tsun have appeared in one or more of Lin's bases, and only 14 are in his core. Outside of Changhua Township, an astounding 35% (182 of 513) of all tsun have been in at least one of Lin's bases, but only 28 have been in at least three of them. This is reflected in his astronomical growth indices. In four elections, Lin's growth index was under 100 only one time. In the other three elections, Lin's bases included areas outside the core much larger than the core itself. In essence, Lin is worse off than a candidate from a small town. A small town candidate will at least have stable support in his or her hometown, even if support is shaky elsewhere. Major city candidates do not have stable support anywhere. Their entire support coalition is unstable.

Table 8: Stability of Lin Hsi-shan, Major City, Changhua County

Year	Defense	Growth	Total Votes Won	Votes Won in Core	Core Magnitude	Core Intensity
1989	85.4	161.2	67653	9282	9.4	2.12
1992	96.4	128.3	65867	9698	12.8	2.54
1995	90.6	171.4	62668	9227	12.4	2.29
1998	75.2	72.3	42766	6964	11.6	1.93


Figure 6: Core of Lin Hsi-shan, Major City, Changhua County



With the above analysis, it is worth asking if the stability of candidates' vote coalitions is determined entirely by the size of their hometowns. Are all candidates doomed to a certain level of stability by the dictates of localism? Military candidates seem to have escaped this rule. By virtue of unique positioning in the field of candidates, they have a stable support coalition completely independent of the size of their hometown. Other candidates should be able to follow this pattern. For example, in Pingtung County there are enough Hakka voters that a Hakka candidate could build a successful campaign around an appeal to this constituency. Taichung and Kaohsiung Counties also have large Hakka minorities that could serve as the vanguard of a candidate's support coalition. It should also be possible for fish farmers in Tainan County, tea farmers in Nantou County, or rice farmers in Ilan County to unite behind a fish, tea, or rice champion. However, in practice, we don't find these types of candidates among the legislative candidates in our sample. In fact, the only way candidates seem able to escape the level of stability designated by the size of their hometown is, paradoxically, by an appeal to localism. Some candidates from small townships simply enlarge their home markets by redefinition. Instead of saying they are from a certain township, they appeal to voters of a certain region, which may include three or four townships. However, this is not as easy as it sounds. The success of this redefinition depends largely on whether the region exists in the minds of voters, as opposed to only existing in the minds of the candidate's strategists. For example, in the map of Changhua County in Figure 6, Lukang and Homei townships are adjacent to each other. However, a candidate seeking to define herself as a Lukang-Homei representative would probably fail, since historically the two townships have not voted for the same people. She would likely be much more successful as a Lukang-Fuhsing candidate, as these two towns are linked more closely in the minds of voters.

As an example of a candidate with a redefined hometown, we look at Chiu Chui-chen. Chiu is a three term DPP legislator from Taoyuan County. His hometown of Tayuan is not a substantial population center. By itself Tayuan represented 31% of a seat in 1992, 37% in 1995, and 55% in 1998. However, Chiu redefined himself as a coastal candidate. Taoyuan County is most commonly divided into a Minnan North and a Hakka South, but the coastal region is also a distinct area. Economically, it is far less developed than the inland areas. It also has a much lower percentage of mainlanders. In particular, Chiu's redefined home consists of three of the four coastal townships. Together, they

Figure 7: Core of Chiu Chui-chen, Expanded Hometown, Taoyuan County



accounted for 83% of a seat in 1992, 99% in 1995, and 153% in 1998. Thus, when Chiu's home is redefined, he must be reclassified as a large town candidate rather than a small town candidate. In fact, this is exactly the pattern of his support. Figure 7 shows that Chiu's core is concentrated almost entirely in Luchu, Tayuan, and Kuanyin townships. Outside of these three towns, there are very few tsun in either his core or in any of his bases. In fact, his growth index never exceeded 13. However, Chiu's core is big enough that he was elected all three times by comfortable margins. In each election, his core magnitude was between 35 and 50, reflecting the fact that after the votes inside his core were counted, Chiu did not need too many more votes to win. In essence, there is not that much difference between Chiu's base and that of Lu Hsin-min, our typical large town candidate.

Table 9: Stability of Chiu Chui-chen, Expanded Hometown, Taoyuan County

Year	Defense	Growth	Total Votes Won	Votes Won in Core	Core Magnitude	Core Intensity
1992	95.8	4.5	67183	31687	40.4	4.82
1995	100.0	13.1	78926	36361	51.3	5.88
1998	89.2	11.5	45855	18522	35.9	3.14

Conclusion

The size of a candidate's hometown has an enormous influence on the stability of his or her vote support. Localism seems to far outweigh other factors, such as party affiliation or factional background. Candidates associated with the KMT's Huang Fu-hsing are an exception to this rule, and other candidates with a strong ideological or ethnic appeal to a substantial constituency could probably also develop stable support regardless of the size of their hometowns. However, in practice, there are not many candidates who base their campaigns on these appeals. Localism is by far the dominant theme. Local votes are stable. However, the flip side of the coin is that support from other areas is extremely unstable. It tends to come and go. Because of this, candidates from large townships do not depend on it. They try to accumulate large numbers of votes at home. Candidates from

small towns have no choice. Their stable hometown support is not enough to win an election. They must go out into other areas of the election district to seek votes. However, they do not generally get support from the same areas in successive elections. Rather, they must continually find new areas to replace the old areas that have chosen to support someone else. It is very difficult to break out of this pattern. The only small town candidates who are able to build a more consistent support coalition are those that expand their home markets by redefinition. However, they still depend on local votes, so this really proves rather than disproves the importance of localism toward stability.

These findings lead us to doubt the conventional wisdom about the stability of candidates' support. Pundits who suggest that a certain candidate is invulnerable because his or her grassroots support is rock solid are probably wrong. Many candidates have rock solid support at home, but since the great majority of candidates come from small towns, this does not translate into automatic re-election. In fact, since outside their home areas small town candidates have to build new support coalitions almost from scratch in each election, it seems more likely that defeat is a real possibility in every election, even for well established politicians.

In terms of the development of Taiwan's democracy, the fact that localism looms so large is not an encouraging sign. In the words of V.O. Key, "In its extreme form localism justifies a diagnosis of low voter interest in public issues and a susceptibility to control by the irrelevant appeal to support the home-town boy (1949: 37)." As long as large numbers of voters continue to cast their ballots on the basis of the candidate's place of birth instead of the impact he or she will have on public policy, problems such as the influence of money and organized crime in politics will probably persist.

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註 釋

- 註 一：For the sake of simplicity, all tsun and li, sometimes translated as villages or wards, are referred to as “tsun.”
- 註 二：For the sake of simplicity, all hsiang, chen, shih, and chu are referred to as “townships.”
- 註 三：The 53 candidates account for a total of 171 campaigns. There should be 172 campaigns. However, the partition of Taipei County into three electoral districts in 1998 resulted in the separation of one candidate, Chou Po-lun (DPP, Taipei County) from most of the tsun in his core. Most of Chou's core was located in the third district. However, Chou chose to run in the first district. Because of this, we do not consider his 1998 campaign as a valid case. No other Taipei County candidates chose to abandon their core areas.
- 註 四：This figure is pulled downward because in 1998 the number of seats in the legislature was increased enough to allow Huang Fu-hsing to nominate two candidates in Taoyuan County. Half of the votes were given to a new candidate, and so the old candidate's defense index was only 59. Thus, actual stability is underestimated.
- 註 五：There are also nine tsun in Sanmin, Taoyuan, and Maolin townships inside Hsiao's core. However, the overwhelming majority in these three townships are aborigines who vote in a special aboriginal constituency. The number of votes Hsiao gets from these areas is actually negligible.
- 註 六：In fact, these numbers underestimate Lu's stability. In 1992, Pateh had 28 tsun. In 1995, due to increase in population, 6 new tsun were created. By 1998, the number of tsun had increased to 39. In all three elections, all of the currently existing tsun were inside Lu's base. However, since 5 tsun only existed for one election, they do not meet the requirement of being inside two bases and so are not inside Lu's core. Thus, while these areas should be part of the core, they show up as “extra” growth. Almost all of the large town candidates suffer this bias, since almost all large towns have growing populations and, therefore, newly created tsun. So these candidates' support is actually even more stable than the numbers would indicate.

審查意見答覆

評審意見(-)：

作者試圖去找出候選人的得票基礎，然後驗證一個對台灣選舉的傳統看法，此即現任多數立委都有相當穩定的得票基礎，然而，他的發現卻挑戰了這個說法，他發現立委候選人的得票基礎並沒有我們想像中的穩定。

作者相當認真的蒐集了自一九九八以來立委選舉（以及其他類選舉）各候選人在各村里的得票資料，作者的用心可見，但是作者在挑戰一個傳統的看法，而在挑戰一個傳統看法的時候，讀者的批判自然會較為犀利，因此作者必須提供足夠的說服力。這幾個問題請作者給予較完整的補充與答覆，使本篇文章對選舉研究的領域更有貢獻：

第一，作者捨棄了一般較容易懂，也較易採用的標準差。而採用他自己模擬出來的B曲線函數（p.6），」對此一函數評論者有兩個問題，(-)作者此一B函數是模擬了許多類選舉的結果，但是如果觀察圖一，B曲線與立委選舉的點有相當大的距離，所以B曲線其實比較反映了其他類選舉，而不是立委選舉，所以請教作者，如果只以立委選舉來模擬，B曲線函數是否有不同？(二)如果作者將時間點加長，譬如1980年開始，則此一B曲線是否會有不同，則此一公式就比較難讓後面的研究者在這個基礎上往前邁進，不知作者是不認為如此？

第二，作者以村里為資料蒐集與分析的單位，但是究竟什麼單位較適當，與選舉的性質和規模有關，例如市議員選舉也許選區規模較小，故而村里也是一個適當的單位，但是對立委選舉是不是一個適當的單位？如果換一個單位，譬如鄉鎮，結論是不是會不一樣？是不是立委的得票基礎其實是滿穩定的？

第三，如果真如作者所說的，現任立委並沒有那麼穩定得得票基礎，那麼，作者是不是該作一些解釋或分析，譬如從1989年以前就是如此，還是1989年以後才是如此不穩定。

第四，作者在呈現資料時，舉出許多特定的候選人來說明，使人不太了解這些人是特例，還是代表某一部份人的情況，而這一部份人又佔有多少比例？評論者同意作者舉一些例子來讓讀者瞭解作者的測量方法，但是，也請提供一個整體立委候選人的統計，如此讓人較了解整體的情況，而非僅是特例。

第五，請作者將測量指標與一些變數，譬如派系、黨籍等作一些交叉分析，將更有助於讀者去衡量測量指標的適當性。

評審意見(二)：

候選人地盤的說法，其來有自，作者將之納入學術研究，值得肯定。不過作者似乎太執著於地盤與非地盤的二分法，急於找出其分界點，卻相當程度忽略了學理的基礎。在概念上，地盤應是指穩定之選票來源，展現在歷次選舉之得票率上，因此只是票源的一種簡化的說法，測量上可以是連續的程度之分，無須一定要二分。事實上，作者也將村里進一步區分為 core, neighboring and scattered (pp. 10-11)，也反映此一觀念。

倘若一定要將之二分，則其 threshold 一定要有堅強之學理基礎，而這正是其 B function (p. 6) 的 Achilles' heel。由於 B 值決定地盤與非地盤的分界，而全文建立之種種指標均與地盤有關，故對 B 值的疑慮更延伸至後續之所有分析。作者唯一的理由，是 B 值為候選人得票率標準差之近似值，且不受應選席次 M 以外其他因素之干擾。問題是：用標準差 (SD) 摘述得票率之集散程度是一回事，以一個 SD 二分地盤與否，則是另一回事。換言之，一個 SD 本身做為「加碼基準」已乏學理基礎，更何況其武斷之近似值？加上同一候選人得票率 (i 在歷屆選舉中必有起伏，縱使其選區應選席次 M 不變，劃分地盤之標準卻會因選舉而變；衡量的標準本身不穩定，又如何據以判定支持度是否穩定？這些都是作者亟需正視並解答的問題。

此外，每一個指標都應詳述其值域 (例如等)，並證明之。

作者答辯：

I would like to thank the referee for a set of incisive and biting comments. I will address these comments one at a time.

It is pointed out that the B curve is not a completely accurate portrayal of the standard deviations of legislative candidates from 1989 to 1998. What if I were to use a different set of data. Would my result be different? The answer is no. The whole point of the B curve is to make the results independent of the data. Previous attempts to analyze the concentration of votes have compared candidates against each other. However, these analyses are subject to change as the data changes. This paper is an attempt to compare candidates to some exogenous standard. The downside, as the referee has so pointedly noticed, is that the standard selected is entirely arbitrary. This is the price I have chosen to pay for the flexibility to add future data.

Another suggestion is that I use townships as the primary unit of analysis. Perhaps I would find more evidence of stability using townships, but this would be a false stability. If candidates' support coalitions are stable, vote totals at all geographic levels should be

stable. Stability at the township level accompanied by instability at the tsun level would not be evidence that the same people are voting for a candidate in repeated elections.

The referee wonders if this trend of instability predates 1989. I would also like to know this. However, since my data only includes the period 1989–1998, this is a question I cannot answer.

In the paper, I present several candidates as examples of different types of bases. Are these candidates representative? No, they are not. I chose some of the starkest examples I could find precisely to illustrate what a "pure" type would look like. Most bases are somewhat less extreme than those portrayed in the paper. However, the main exception to this generalization is the candidate with a small hometown. There were numerous examples that would have served equally well to illustrate this type of base. Candidates with small hometowns are, significantly, the most common type of candidates; they are also the ones upon whom the argument of instability is based.

Finally, it is argued that a base should not be a binary concept. In principal, I agree. There are subtle differences between mildly strong, strong, and extremely strong areas. If I were writing a case study, I certainly would not use a simple binary classification. However, with thousands of candidates to consider, simplification is a necessity. As with many of the other excellent points, I can only respond that I will keep trying to overcome these difficulties, but at this point the current model is the best that I can present coherently.

選舉地盤：候選人票源凝聚程度之分析

鮑 彤*

《 本文摘要 》

在台灣，許多研究者認為因為多數立法委員享有雄厚的基層實力，所以在不同選舉中，可獲得幾乎同一批選民的支持，此篇論文即著眼於，檢證這個假設。此篇論文所採用的研究方法是分析候選人得票率最高的地區，在此地區尋找不穩定的蹟象。

大體而言，我們發現多數候選人的支持基礎並不穩定。於不同次選舉之間，候選人的地盤可能發生不少變動。換言之，有不少候選人是依賴相異的票源基礎而連任。影響候選人地盤穩定最重要的變數是候選人故鄉人口的多寡。來自較大鄉鎮市的候選人，地盤較為穩定。

關鍵詞：競選策略、政治版圖、選舉地盤、選舉穩定性

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